






Adams, D. , De Sousa, C. and Tiesdell, S. (2010) Brownfield development: 
A comparison of North American and British approaches. Urban Studies, 
47(1), pp. 75-104. (doi: 10.1177/0042098009346868) 
 
The material cannot be used for any other purpose without further 
permission of the publisher and is for private use only. 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 


















Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of       





BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARISON OF NORTH AMERICAN AND 
BRITISH APPROACHES 
 
Accepted version of paper published in Urban Studies (2010), 47 (1), 75-104 . 
 
Published version available at: doi.org/10.1177/0042098009346868 
 




Over the past 30 to 40 years, urban change and deindustrialisation in advanced economies have 
created a legacy of vacant and derelict land that is increasingly seen as a development opportunity 
rather than planning problem. This paper investigates how the shared challenge of bringing such 
brownfield sites back into productive use has been interpreted differently in four countries: the 
United States, Canada, Scotland and England. In each case, the particular policy environment has 
shaped the brownfield debate in distinctive ways, producing a different set of relations between 
the public and private sectors in brownfield redevelopment. Through this detailed comparison of 
the North American and British experience, the paper traces the maturity of policy and seeks to 
discover whether the main differences in understanding and tackling brownfield land can be 









Over the past 20 years, the term ‘brownfield’ has become an important focus for urban policy on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, the shared challenge of bringing brownfield land back into 
productive use has been matched by confusion in meaning, inconsistency in information, and 
variation in official priorities between different countries. This makes it essential to better 
understand the different ways in which ‘brownfield’ has been interpreted as a concept and policy 
focus in different contexts. 
 
To explore this, four countries - the United States, Canada, England and Scotland - are chosen to 
provide different combinations of institutional circumstances and brownfield significance. The 
federal constitutions of the United States and Canada contrast with the more centralised form of 
governance in the United Kingdom in which, through varying degrees of devolution, the 
Westminster Parliament permits differences in domestic policy between England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. Arguably, these differences are at their most intense between England and 
Scotland, since the different legal systems that have always separated these two nations were 
reinforced in 1999 by the establishment of the Scottish Parliament as a separate law-making 
authority. Domestic policy in Scotland has since begun to diverge significantly from that in 
England. Alongside these institutional differences, the geographical characteristics of these four 
countries have endowed the term ‘brownfield’ with varied meanings and significance, which enable 
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their diverse experiences to illuminate the search for shared knowledge on the likely constituents 
of an effective brownfield land policy.  
 
If brownfield locations are to be seen as areas of future urban opportunity rather than as reminders 
of inherited urban problems, policy may need time to mature, often gradually, but sometimes 
traumatically. This process becomes effective when it creates an institutional framework in which 
brownfield land is consistently seen as a source of strategic profit by the private sector and a means 
of strategic policy delivery by the public sector. To structure and theorise this exposition of 
brownfield policy development, we offer a three-stage ‘policy maturity’ model that involves, first, 
clearly grasping and understanding the brownfield problem; secondly, recognising the potential it 
contains and securing political commitment to action; and, thirdly, generating engagement from 
the private sector. The model is essentially concerned with the temporal stages through which 
what is initially conceived as a policy problem is re-conceptualised over time as a development 
opportunity. Unless this re-conceptualisation takes place strategically rather than sporadically, 
brownfield land is unlikely to be seen as a platform for wholesale urban transformation.  
 
We recognise that such stage models of policy formulation are typically criticised for presenting 
policy formulation in a manner that is too static, too rational, too top-down and too clean-cut (see 
Downs, 1972; Cohen, et al, 1974; Kingdon, 1984; Anderson, 1997; Hudson and Lowe, 2004). In 
practice, the policy formulation process is more dynamic, much less rational, more political, and 
simply messier than simple stage models appear to suggest (Figure 1). By comparing brownfield 
policy development across four countries, we seek to discover how the varied pace and direction 
of policy change can reflect both the more overt process of political decision-making and the more 
covert process of policy learning as experience of actions feed back into the search for policy 
solutions. 
 

























The central element of the policy formulation process shown in Figure 1 is a dialectic, whereby 
the definition of a policy problem informs the initial policy ‘solution’, which informs problem 
redefinition; re-definition of the problem suggests a new or altered policy solution, and so on over 
time. In essence, it is a design process where there is an interactive conversation between problem 
and solution. In this paper, we argue that this dialectic has produced a key conceptual shift, namely 
a reformulation of the brownfield policy challenge from ‘problem’ to ‘opportunity’. 
 
This dialectic of problem and solution is itself informed and affected by two other major sets of 
influences. The first is the general maelstrom of politics, with interest by politicians potentially 
becoming political will and eventually political commitment, noting of course that interest and 
commitment may falter as governments, ministers and public attention inevitably change. Essential 
as initial interest and later political and resource commitment are to policy formulation, such 
influences are essentially top-down. These contrast with a powerful second set of influences, 
namely the evidence derived from, inter alia, experimentation and testing. Over time, evidence thus 
becomes policy learning as lessons are fed back into the process. Knowledge and experience of 
practice also helps shape, frame and perhaps extend the ‘known’ universe of policy solutions. 
Essentially bottom-up, the impact of these influences on policy varies throughout the policy 
formulation period. We seek to compare the importance of these influences as we evaluate how 
brownfield policy has developed in Britain and North America. 
 
Our three-stage ‘policy maturity’ model is thus intended to reflect a broader conceptualisation of 
the process that takes account of the forces acting on and within policy formulation. The three 
stages are reflected in the structure of the paper. The next two sections each look at specific aspects 
of grasping and understanding the brownfield problem, namely defining the term and mapping its 
significance. We then move on to consider the second stage of the policy maturity model, which 
is all about recognising potential and securing commitment. Here again, we look at two aspects of 
this, namely the growing importance governments attach to brownfield redevelopment and the 
main constraints that need to be overcome to make such development a reality. This leads to the 
third stage, where we investigate the keenness (or otherwise) of the private sector to promote 
brownfield redevelopment. Our thesis here is that the maturing or flowering of brownfield policy 
becomes evident in the extent and nature of private sector engagement. In the final section, we 
conclude by evaluating how far each of the four countries investigated have journeyed along the 
route to policy maturity. We identify both differences and similarities and end by considering 
whether the main differences in understanding and tackling brownfield land between North 
America and Britain are due primarily to physical, cultural or institutional factors. 
 
STAGE 1A: GRASPING AND UNDERSTANDING THE BROWNFIELD PROBLEM: 
DEFINING THE TERM 
 
The first stage of policy maturity involves policy makers grasping the full dimensions of ‘the 
brownfield problem’. This requires recognition that the social and economic forces that made 
former uses redundant deserve as much attention as the physical characteristics of the redundant 
sites themselves. Since demand for land and property is derived from the use(s) to which it is put, 
a thorough understanding of the brownfield problem requires policy-makers to connect the site 
and its locality to the sub-national, national and global. In more tangible terms, grasping the 
brownfield problem also involves defining and measuring it.  
 
Policy definition makes an essential contribution towards policy solutions. In this context, it is 
important not to reify particular definitions in a technical or legal sense, but instead to see the 
gradual process of reaching a clearer set of definitions as dialectic in its own right. Specifically, by 
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looking at each country’s experience we can reveal how the narrowness of one definition presents 
a policy problem that calls forth the solution of broader re-definition. We argue that this particular 
dialectic is driven more by policy learning than political imperative. 
 
In the UK, ‘brownfield’ is a relatively recent addition to the official vocabulary of government. For 
many years, the emphasis was on derelict land, defined in England as “land so damaged by previous 
industrial or other development that it is incapable of beneficial use without treatment” (DCLGa, 
2006). Derelict land reclamation was promoted as an instrument of regional policy from the 1960s, 
with local authorities encouraged to seek central government grants for the treatment of land 
scarred by mineral extraction (particularly from coal mining) or other industrial activity. Regular 
dereliction surveys revealed how reclamation struggled to keep up with the increasing impact of 
the deindustrialisation that occurred within cities from the mid-1970s onwards. As a consequence, 
derelict land grants were deployed more as an instrument of urban than regional policy, with their 
focus switched in the 1980s from reclamation of urban fringe land primarily for soft-end uses such 
as parkland to that of inner city land for hard-end uses such as new business parks or housing 
schemes. Policy-makers thus became less concerned with the presence of contamination and more 
with the potential for redevelopment. 
 
Regeneration policy took a similar course in Scotland, although here derelict land was defined 
more precisely as  
 
“… land which has been so damaged by development or use that it is incapable of 
development for beneficial use without rehabilitation and which is not being used for 
the purpose for which it is held or for use acceptable in the local plan or land which 
is not being used and where contamination is known or suspected (even if treatment 
is required only for the buildings thereon)” (Scottish Executive, 2005, p. 45).  
 
From the late 1970s onwards, the increasing extent of vacant but not derelict land within cities 
(DoE, 1992) presented a powerful challenge to UK planning policy, which had long sought to 
contain the force of counter-urbanisation through green belts and other landscape designations. 
As the experience of urban deindustrialisation became ever more intense, the earlier policy focus 
upon derelict land, narrowly defined, was itself perceived as a policy problem that required the 
solution of re-definition. The term ‘brownfield’ thus emerged in the UK, not as the encapsulation 
of any particular condition of the land, but rather as the opposite of ‘greenfield’ (Alker et al, 2000; 
POST, 1998). The challenge then became one of producing a definition to fit the policy (‘to 
increase brownfield redevelopment’), rather than the other way round. The solution, first officially 
articulated in the 60% brownfield housing target proposed for England in 1998, was apparently 
quite simple. If greenfield land has never previously been developed, then by definition, brownfield 





As previously developed land (PDL) benefits from greater planning flexibility and, in that potential 
exists for some overlap at the margin with land that has never been previously developed (for 
example, a redundant airfield in rural area, 90% of which is grassed), a clear official definition of 
PDL become necessary. Although this is now given at length in Annex B to Planning Policy 
Statement 3 (DCLG, 2006b)4, it is neatly summarised by the ODPM (2005, p. 77) as “… previously 
developed land that is unused or may be available for development. It includes both vacant and 
derelict land and land currently in use with known potential for redevelopment. It excludes land 
that was previously developed where the remains have blended into the landscape over time.” This 
definition is the basis for the English statistics collected for the National Land Use Database 
(NLUD) reported later in the paper. In Scotland, there is an even more succinct definition of 
brownfield as  
 
“Land which has previously been developed. The term may encompass vacant or 
derelict land; infill sites; land occupied by redundant or unused buildings; and 
developed land within the settlement boundary where further intensification of use is 
considered acceptable” (Scottish Executive, 2003, p.19). 
 
Up to 2005, the Scottish Vacant and Derelict Land Survey (the main source of relevant statistics 
north of the border) had used rather a loose definition of contamination, on the basis of which it 
reported that in 2005 almost 1,200 hectares or some 16% of all derelict land in Scotland was in 
some way contaminated. The following year, after the survey had changed its definition of 
contamination to the more precise requirements of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, it 
reported that the extent of land known to be affected by contamination was only 132 hectares or 
less than 2% of all derelict land in Scotland. As this demonstrates, there is little connection between 
the words ‘brownfield’ and ‘contamination’ in the UK, with the policy emphasis placed not on 
why land became vacant or derelict, but rather on the processes by which it might be put to use in 
future. 
 
The process of definitional change as part of policy development is also apparent in the US and 
Canada, although in different ways from the UK. The original focus in both countries in the early 
1980s was on contamination. The distinction was often made between known contaminated sites - 
those that had been identified through appropriate testing - and potentially contaminated sites - 
those suspected of being contaminated because of their previous land-use or from an on-site 
environmentally-detrimental event. The term brownfields was adopted in order to attenuate the 
negative connotations and liability implications associated with the label contaminated, especially in 
the US where federal actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liabilities Act (CERCLA 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, 1980, commonly referred to as Superfund) 
began discouraging private investment in any property remotely suspected of contamination. 
 
 
4 Annex B states: “Previously-developed land is that which is or was occupied by a permanent structure, including the 
curtilage of the developed land and any associated fixed surface infrastructure. The definition includes defence 
buildings, but excludes: 
• Land that is or has been occupied by agricultural or forestry buildings. 
• Land that has been developed for minerals extraction or waste disposal by landfill purposes where provision 
for restoration has been made through development control procedures. 
• Land in built-up areas such as parks, recreation grounds and allotments, which, although it may feature paths, 
pavilions and other buildings, has not been previously developed. 
• Land that was previously-developed but where the remains of the permanent structure or fixed surface 
structure have blended into the landscape in the process of time (to the extent that it can reasonably be 
considered as part of the natural surroundings)” 
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The most common definition of brownfield in both the US and Canada is the one put forward by 
the US EPA when it formally launched its Brownfields Action Agenda in 1995.5 The agency 
defined brownfields as “… abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities 
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental 
contamination.” Subsequently, the US Small Business and Liability Relief and Brownfield Revitalization 
Act (Public Law 107-118, H.R. 2869, p. 6), signed into law in 2002, has changed the definition 
slightly to: “Real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated 
by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” As a 
concept, brownfields continues to refer to both known and potentially contaminated sites, although 
direct reference to commercial and industrial sites is no longer implicit in the term. As in the UK, 
this broadened definition represents an official response to perceived policy experience at the local 
level.  
 
While the term contaminated land continues to be used in legislative contexts in Canada, most 
stakeholders favour the term brownfield because it avoids the negative connotations associated 
with the word contaminated and because it constitutes a semantic counterpart to greenfield. Canada 
has also modified its definition of the term brownfield over the years to accord more with the US 
definition:  
 
“Abandoned, idle or underutilized commercial or industrial properties where past 
actions have caused known or suspected environmental contamination, but where 
there is an active potential for redevelopment.” (NRTEE, 2003, p. ix) 
 
The more narrow Canadian reference to development potential (reflecting market viability) and to 
commercial and industrial property is likely to change over time to conform to the US definition. 
In both Canada and the US, ‘brownfields’ has now become a term widely used in public policy, 
the development industry and even common parlance. 
 
Unlike the UK and Scotland, vacant and unused land that is not suspected of contamination is not 
labeled as a brownfield. This has led to the separate use of the term vacant land and to the creation 
of terms such as ‘greyfield’, which refers to outdated retail and commercial sites where 
contamination is not necessarily suspected (Pagano and Bowman 2000)6. Here, we see a pragmatic 
and ‘bottom-up’ solution seeking to overcome the narrowness of official decisions. Yet, even if 
laudable from an urban renewal perspective, broadening the term ‘brownfield’ could face political 
and administrative barriers in the USA and Canada. In the US, the dominance of the US 
Environmental Protection Agency and state environmental agencies in brownfield matters have 
created an environmental policy imperative, whether in relation to contamination or the larger 
question of sustainability. Many Canadian provinces have also kept the focus on contamination to 
minimize the risk of local government interference into the property market, both within and 
between cities. 
 
From this analysis, we can see how the term ‘brownfield’ has evolved in meaning across all four 
countries as unofficial ‘bottom-up’ conceptualisations and experience in practice have interacted 
with official definitions. Significantly, the process of policy re-conceptualisation, which emphasises 
the development potential of brownfield land irrespective of use, has required broader official 
 
5 Interestingly, the term ‘brownfield’ had been first employed in the US by Charles Bartsch from the Northeast 
Midwest Institute, a non-profit agency, who used the phrase ‘brownfield expansion’ to describe a specific type of 
process for modernizing existing steel plants rather than necessarily to connote a potentially contaminated site (Yount, 
2003). 
6 Other recent additions to US brownfield language include UST-fields (leaking underground storage tanks) and 
Portfields (location where many brownfield sites cluster). 
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definitions across all countries that reflect the experience of earlier policy testing. In the final 
section of the paper, we seek to account for the different definitions that still exist in Britain and 
North America. At this point, however, it is important to note that no single definition should be 
regarded as fixed, but rather as reflective of the particular understanding of the policy problem at 
that time and, until its shortcomings become apparent, the perceived basis for policy solutions. 
 
STAGE 1B: GRASPING AND UNDERSTANDING THE BROWNFIELD PROBLEM: 
MAPPING ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Grasping the brownfield problem also involves measuring as well as defining it. This makes the 
creation of effective brownfield information systems another important component of the policy 
response to the perceived problem. In this section, we draw on recent research and publicly 
available statistics to examine the significance of brownfield land in each country. One might 
expect more sophisticated information systems to be a useful indicator of policy maturity. Yet, a 
contrast must also be drawn between the British emphasis on national information systems, which 
places national consistency above local innovation and those in North America, which allow much 
local experimentation, albeit at the expense of national consistency. 
 
As already intimated, the two main UK data sources tracking the extent of brownfield land are the 
National Land Use Database (NLUD) and the Scottish Vacant and Derelict Land Survey (SVDLS). 
While both surveys are published on an annual basis, allowing trend information to be portrayed, 
NLUD is more recent and provides a clearer view of development potential. 
 
NLUD was launched in 1998, updated in 2001 when minor changes were made to the definitional 
base, and has thereafter been published on an annual basis. Significantly, the database is not limited 
to land and buildings already vacant but seeks to make some assessment of important 
redevelopment opportunities likely to arise in the future, even if still in current use. It therefore 
categorises entries under five headings: 
 
• Previously developed land which is now vacant 
• Vacant buildings 
• Derelict land and buildings 
• Land or buildings currently in use and allocated in the local plan and/or having planning 
permission 
• Land or buildings currently in use where it is known there is potential for redevelopment 
(but the sites do not have any plan allocation or planning permission) 
 
In each case, NLUD makes some estimate of residential development potential by indicating the 
extent of land considered suitable for residential development and the dwellings capacity, given 
certain (changing) density assumptions. Since NLUD information is gathered from individual local 
authorities, the results are available by the nine English regions and for each local authority. 
However, our concern here is primarily with trends in the national figures since 2001, when the 
current definitional base was established. These are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Trends in previously-developed land by land type: England 2001 to 2007 (Hectares) 
        
Land/building type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
        
Vacant and derelict land and buildings        
Previously-developed vacant land 14,730 15,680 14,610 14,100 13,920 13,330 12,710 
Derelict land and buildings 21,410 19,960 20,550 19,870 18,720 17,850 16,810 
Vacant buildings 4,990 5,070 4,550 4,200 3,920 3,670 4,080 
All vacant and derelict land and buildings 41,130 40,710 39,710 38,170 36,560 34,850 33,600 
Index (2001 = 100) 100.0 99.0 96.5 92.8 88.9 84.7 81.7 
        
Currently in Use        
Allocated in a local plan or with planning permission for any use 14,030 16,570 17,580 18,120 18,920 18,430  17,770 
Known redevelopment potential but no planning allocation or permission 10,350 8,830 8,470 7,840 8,010 9,450 10,750 
All currently in use 24,380 25,400 26,050 25,960 26,930 27,880 28,520 
Index (2001 = 100) 100.0 104.2 106.8 106.5 110.5 114.4 117.0 
        
Total  65,510 66,110 65,760 64,130 63,490 62,730 62,120 
Index (2001 = 100) 100.0 100.9 100.4 97.9 96.9 95.8 94.8 
        
Residential development potential        
Land considered suitable for housing 28,060 28,000 29,000 28,600 27,600 26,750 26,510 
Index (2001 = 100) 100.0 99.8 103.3 101.9 98.4 95.3 94.5 
        
Dwellings capacity 919,100 870,000 950,000 986,000 981,000 974,000 1,051,030 
Index (2001 = 100) 100.0 94.7 103.4 107.3 106.7 106.0 114.4 
        
Density assumption 32.8 31.1 32.8 34.5 35.5 36.4 39.6 
        





As Table 1 shows, in 2007 some 62,120 hectares of land in England was either vacant, derelict or 
considered to have redevelopment potential. To set this figure in context, it represented some 
5.4% of the total developed area of urban England. Between 2001 and 2007, there was an 18% 
reduction in the extent of vacant land and buildings in England, but a 17% increase in land 
currently in use but considered to have redevelopment potential. While the extent of land within 
NLUD considered suitable for housing (about 43% of the total by 2007) fell slightly between 2001 
and 2007, the dwellings capacity rose by about 14% over this period, primarily because density 
assumptions were increased as a result of changing government policy. The three regions with the 
highest amount of vacant and derelict land and buildings in 2007 were respectively North West 
England, Yorkshire and the Humber and the West Midlands, each of which has borne the brunt 
of successive waves of deindustrialisation from the mid-1970s. In contrast, the prosperous South 
East of England had by far the largest amount of land currently in use but considered to have 
redevelopment potential, so highlighting the strength of market demand as the main 
redevelopment driver. 
 
The overall pattern of change shown in Table 1 subsumes both inflows and outflows. For example, 
although the total amount of NLUD land fell by only 1% between 2004 and 2005 (from 64,130 to 
63,490 hectares), this disguised the fact that some 6% of the 2004 total was developed by 2005, 
and another 4% was withdrawn from the survey as it no longer fitted the definitional requirements. 
This outflow was matched by an inflow equivalent to 7% of the 2004 total. There is an important 
lesson here for those who mistakenly concentrate on the brownfield stock and see it as a finite 
resource, gradually to be whittled down to zero. In fact, annual flows into and out of the stock are 
likely to be far more significant in the long term, since they reflect the reality of a complex 
redevelopment process in which redundancy will always be producing new brownfield sites, while 
redevelopment will be making use of others. The relative balance between these two forces at any 
point in time will be the main determinant of changes in the stock.  
 
A clearer picture of how these components of change affect the overall stock each year can be 
gleaned from the Scottish Vacant and Derelict Land Survey, which has been undertaken north of 
the border over a longer time period than NLUD. The results (presented in Table 2) again show 
how the almost static stock of vacant and derelict land between 2001 and 2007 disguises significant 
annual inflows and outflows. These may be due to real change (redundancy or redevelopment) 
naturalisation or to definitional or unexplained change. Even though the latter are a relatively small 
proportion of the total stock, they can have an important influence on the annual flow, suggesting 
room for improvement in the way the data is collected. 
 
In the US, national tracking of brownfield sites and their redevelopment is sporadic and does not 
involve accurate accounting. Over time, a tiered system has crystallized whereby the different levels 
of government work in tandem to compile and manage different kinds of brownfield information. 
Hazardous waste sites deemed to pose the greatest risk to human health and the environment are 
tracked on the EPA’s computerized inventory system (CERCLIS), thus coming under the 
jurisdiction of the Superfund programme. Hazardous waste information related to treatment, 
storage, and disposal facilities is also catalogued nationally in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act Information (RCRAInfo) system.
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Table 2: Vacant and Derelict Land in Scotland: Components of Change Analysis 1996-2007 (Hectares) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Year Start             
Stock of derelict land brought forward 8778 8482 7858 7787 7237 7148 6825 7614 7624 7658 7615 7480 
Stock of vacant land brought forward 4944 4619 4612 4425 4371 4086 3692 2982 2890 2819 2874 2906 
Total vacant and derelict land brought forward 13722 13101 12470 12212 11608 11234 10517 10596 10514 10477 10489 10386 
Inflows             
Land becoming derelict 192 228 542 460 363 234 932 293 190 331 155 232 
Land becoming vacant 234 382 369 479 184 287 210 196 220 385 300 136 
Total inflows 426 610 911 939 547 521 1142 489 410 716 455 368 
Ouflows             
Derelict land reclaimed 293 616 468 764 301 449 293 308 181 448 252 324 
Vacant land brought into use 395 374 355 537 299 343 391 271 285 287 305 318 
Derelict land removed from register for definitional reasons 329 98 288 146 171 106 116 72 136 11 42 36 
Vacant land removed from register for definitional reasons 50 79 106 59 35 249 237 88 37 13 73 72 
Derelict land removed from register owing to naturalisation     64 185 187 101 1   17 
Vacant land removed from register owing to naturalisation     12 67 30 13  72 90 20 
Total outflows 1067 1167 1217 1506 882 1399 1254 853 640 831 762 787 
Other Adjustments             
Unexplained change in derelict land 134 -138 143 -100 84 183 453 198 162 85 4 245 
Unexplained change in vacant land -114 64 -95 63 -123 -22 -262 84 31 42 200 28 
Total other adjustments 20 -74 48 -37 -39 161 191 282 193 127 204 273 
Total Net Flow -621 -631 -258 -604 -374 -717 79 -82 -37 12 -103 -146 
Year End             
Stock of derelict land carried forward 8482 7858 7787 7237 7148 6825 7614 7624 7658 7615 7480 7580 
Stock of vacant land carried forward 4619 4612 4425 4371 4086 3692 2982 2890 2819 2874 2906 2660 
Total vacant and derelict land carried forward 13101 12470 12212 11608 11234 10517 10596 10514 10477 10489 10386 10240 
Derelict land as % of total stock 64.7 63.0 63.8 62.3 63.6 64.9 71.9 72.5 73.1 72.6 72.0 74.0 
Vacant land as % of total stock 35.3 37.0 36.2 37.7 36.4 35.1 28.1 27.5 26.9 27.4 28.0 26.0 
Net flow due to real change -262 -380 88 -362 -53 -271 458 -90 -56 -19 -102 -274 
Net flow due to definitional, natural or unexplained change -359 -251 -346 -242 -321 -446 -379 8 19 31 -1 128 
Source: Scottish Vacant and Derelict Land Surveys 1996-2007 
There is no strict definition of the term  ‘naturalisation’ in the survey, although it is used in reference to vacant or derelict sites that “appear to have blended back into the 
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Many state and local governments also maintain brownfield inventories, although there is no 
standardized approach for identifying the types of sites to be included or the information 
maintained. Over a dozen states also maintain extensive records on brownfield projects involved 
in their voluntary cleanup programs, although the data recorded in such cases is highly variable 
(US EPA 2006). Unfortunately, the type of information gathered by most states and cities does 
not allow for an assessment of the overall increase or decrease in the stock of brownfield land, 
making it difficult to track progress. By far the most widely referenced local government source of 
information regarding the quantity of urban brownfield sites in the US are the US Conference of 
Mayors surveys, which have been administered to member local governments since 1998. It should 
be noted, however, that participation in this survey is voluntary and that there are no specific 
parameters set for defining and tracking brownfield data. Syms and Simons (1999) note that the 
lack of a comprehensive registry system in the US has been partly attributed to resistance from 
real estate interests, fearing the stigma that could be attached to property if it were listed. 
 
In the early 1990s, the Canadian federal government attempted to develop a national approach to 
brownfield inventory-making, but provinces were unable to reach an agreement on the scope and 
potential use of a contaminated sites inventory (Auditor General of Canada, 1995). Consequently, 
the federal government set up a Contaminated Sites Management Working Group in 1995 to gather 
appropriate information only for federal lands. Federal departments have also developed a 
consistent classification of contaminated sites based on the extent to which they require remedial 
action. 
 
Except for federal contaminated sites, only sporadic data can be found with regard to the 
brownfield situation in Canada. No standard municipal approach for brownfield inventories exists 
and only a handful of cities have developed one of their own. As in the US, most cities and 
government agencies continue to postpone the development of formal brownfield inventories for 
fear that properties might be stigmatized and their values reduced, with liabilities ensuing for the 
agencies involved in compiling them. 
 
It is thus not possible to provide comprehensive brownfield statistics for the United States and 
Canada, although in Table 3, we have sought to gather together findings from some of the studies 
undertaken in recent years. Despite the advantage of local variation and innovation in the 
brownfield statistics that are kept in North America, lack of political interest and will keeps this 
aspect of brownfield policy at an immature stage since it remains impossible to know whether the 
problem is getting larger or smaller. This contrasts with the British experience, where the 
requirement for comprehensive statistics has been driven from the political centre and has ensured 
that policy-makers can now access better information than their predecessors of two decades ago. 
Nevertheless, in Britain and especially in North America, there remains scope for more systematic 
and detailed data, as experience reveals the limitations of existing systems, calling forth further 
refinements to overcome their problems. A key point, however, for our policy maturity model, is 
that limited information does not necessarily inhibit policy advancement, as the discussion of Stage 




Table 3: Summary of findings from key studies on extent of brownfields in United States and Canada 
Source Focus Findings 
United States 
Simons (1998) US as a whole Over 384,400 brownfield sites 
Simons (1998) 31 of largest US cities Over 75,000 brownfield sites, taking up over 46,000 hectares or 6% of land area 
US Government Accountability 
Office (2000) 
US as a whole Between 130,000 and 450,000 commercial and industrial brownfield sites 
Pagano and Bowman (2000) 70 US cities On average 15% of city land deemed vacant, ranged from undisturbed open space to brownfield land 
US Conference of Mayors (2006) 172 US cities 23,810 brownfield sites of between 2 and 6 hectares in size. Total brownfield land in subset of 158 cities amounted 
to almost 39,00 hectares 
US Environmental Protection 
Agency (2006) 
US as a whole 48,000 brownfield sites already cleaned up via state Brownfields and Voluntary Response Programs  
US Environmental Protection 
Agency (2007) 
US as a whole Between 450,000 and 1,000,000 brownfield sites 
EPA (2007) National Priorities List US as a whole 1,618 brownfield sites designated in most hazardous category, of which 1,240 active, 317 archived and 61 
proposed 
Canada 
Sisson (1989) Canada as a whole Around 30,000 potentially contaminated brownfield sites 
National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy 
(1996) 
Canada as a whole Around 2,900 potentially contaminated brownfield sites 
Contaminated Sites Management 
Working Group (1997) 
Environmental site assessment of 
over 4,400 Canadian federal sites 
Action definitely required at 860 sites, probably required at 1,784, and likely to be required at 1,088 
De Sousa (2006a) 11 largest Canadian cities Over 1,900 brownfields amounting to around 11,300 hectares 
De Sousa (2006a) 12 Canadian cities Some 203 remediation/redevelopment projects completed in 12 cities; divided between residential (47%) retail 
(20%), commercial/office (16%), open space (12%), industrial (2%), and institutional (2%) according to data from 




STAGE 2A: RECOGNISING POTENTIAL AND SECURING COMMITMENT: THE 
IMPORTANCE GOVERNMENTS ATTACH TO BROWNFIELD 
REDEVELOPMENT 
 
The second stage towards policy maturity involves policy-makers moving beyond the definition 
and measurement of brownfield land towards recognition and articulation of its potential. Going 
well beyond treatment policies targeted at individual sites, this involves an appreciation of the 
potential overall contribution of brownfield land towards the achievement of broader policies. 
While it includes the articulation of new urban visions and development products, this stage is 
much more than a simple promotional exercise. This is because realisation of potential requires a 
mature understanding of the actions needed to achieve it. Since brownfield land is by definition 
often intricately embedded into the urban fabric, recognition of potential is thus clearly associated 
with an appreciation that its realisation requires practical action to overcome physical, ownership 
and other constraints to its redevelopment. 
 
There has been a clear correlation, at least in England, between government interest in brownfield 
redevelopment and the extent of public and political concern about environmental matters and, 
specifically about the likely scale of prospective greenfield development. It provides the best 
example among the four countries of how the progression from political interest to political will 
and then political commitment can drive the search for policy solutions to perceived problems. 
Three specific turning points in brownfield policy illustrate this well. In March 1995, the then 
Conservative Government published new and highly controversial household projections, which 
suggested that households numbers in England would increase by 4.4 million (or 23%) between 
1991 and 2016 (DoE, 1995). Subsequently, that June, it announced that it wished to see half of all 
new homes in England built on re-used sites. Although primarily aspirational, this announcement 
represented the first serious political interest in brownfield policy in the UK. As Murdoch (2004, 
p. 53) comments:  
 
“The publication of this (4.4 million) figure conjured up the spectre of new houses 
spreading across the English countryside. It therefore allowed the Campaign for the 
Protection of Rural England (CPRE) and other environmental groups to mount a 
serious challenge to the ‘demand-led’ discourse, which they claimed had long prevailed 
within the planning-for-housing arena. This challenge profoundly affected the political 
context around planning and led John Major’s Conservative government to defer 
making any decision on the allocation of land for the required new homes prior to the 
1997 General Election. Thus, Tony Blair’s Labour Government inherited a planning 
for housing crisis and needed to quickly put a viable planning-for-housing policy into 
operation. In formulating its proposals, the new government seemed surprisingly 
receptive to CPRE’s views.”  
 
This crisis heralded the second turning point in brownfield policy which came in 1998 when John 
Prescott, the incoming minister responsible for planning and housing announced that the new 
Government intended “… to raise the proportion of new homes we expect to be built on 
previously developed land from 50% to 60%, to be achieved over the next ten years” (DETR, 
1998, paragraph 4).  
 
Prescott’s expression of political will was shortly followed by political commitment. In the final 
version of this policy, it was decided to include conversions within the 60% target, which was then 
formally expressed as follows: “The national target is that by 2008, 60% of additional housing 
should be provided on previously-developed land and through the conversion of existing 
buildings” (DETR, 2000a, paragraph 23).
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Table 4: Total dwellings built on previously-developed land plus estimated conversions in England 1985-2007 
Year Land Dwellings 
Total hectares of 







% of land used 




Total hectares of 





Index of land 
used for new 
























1985 8760  39 3416 107.8     
1986 7055  38 2681 84.6     
1987 7500  38 2850 89.9     
1988 7730 52 41 3169 100.0     
1989 5660 52 44 2470 77.9  55   
1990 7240 51 45 3270 103.2 163899 54 88505 107.0 
1991 4640 50 45 2080 65.6 154595 53 81935 99.0 
1992 5200 53 47 2470 77.9 143831 56 80545 97.4 
1993 5570 53 48 2700 85.2 147835 56 82788 100.1 
1994 6230 51 46 2880 90.9 154641 54 83506 100.9 
1995 5820 54 48 2820 89.0 157141 57 89570 108.3 
1996 5120 54 48 2430 76.7 149086 57 84979 102.7 
1997 5630 53 47 2660 83.9 149493 56 83716 101.2 
1998 5490 55 48 2650 83.6 142651 58 82738 100.0 
1999  56 50   141040 59 83214 100.6 
2000 5370 59 52 2790 88.0 135130 62 83781 101.3 
2001 5460 61 55 2990 94.3 129530 64 82899 100.2 
2002 5050 64 57 2870 90.6 136820 67 91669 110.8 
2003 5250 67 58 3030 95.6 144040 70 100828 121.9 
2004 3780 72 62 2340 73.8 154110 75 115583 139.7 
2005 4240 74 63 2670 84.2 159480 77 122800 148.4 
2006 4090 73 64 2620 82.7 160870 76 122261 147.8 
2007  73 69   174550 77 134404 162.4 
2008      141930    




What happened next provides an excellent illustration of the dialectic introduced in Figure 1. 
Those who regarded the imposition of the 60% target as ‘problem solved’ were soon to be 
disappointed, for in practice, it had merely changed the nature of the problem and initiated the 
search for a new solution. While headline figures suggested a steady improvement in the target 
figure from 58% in 1998 to 64% in 2001, this disguised an almost static picture in the number of 
dwellings completed on brownfield land in England, which remained around 83,000 in both years. 
This was a classic case where the virtual reliance of the policy on the planning system to refuse 
greenfield development helped cut overall housebuilding from almost 143,000 in 1998 to below 
130,000 in 2001, while doing almost nothing to produce additional brownfield development. This 
is revealed in Table 4, which for the first time, brings together in some detail separate official 
statistics on housebuilding and land use to demonstrate the limitations of proportionate brownfield 
targets. The resultant concerns over increasing house prices and restricted affordability caused the 
Government to establish the Barker Review (2003 & 2004) and produced the third turning point 
in brownfield policy, with the publication of the Sustainable Communities Plan (ODPM, 2003). 
 
To address the growing housing shortage, especially in South East England, the Sustainable 
Communities Plan proposed additional development of some 200,000 houses by 2016 above 
previously planned figures to be built in four growth areas, three of which were primarily greenfield 
locations. It can be regarded as an intended solution to some of the problems created by the 60% 
brownfield target. Such a plan would have been politically unfeasible in the context of intense 
pressure from anti-development and environmental interests, unless matched by a more explicitly 
interventionist approach to brownfield development to replace the previous mere reliance on a 
target figure. The heart of this new interventionist approach involved “a new strategic role” for 
English Partnerships (the Government’s urban regeneration agency) “… to find and assemble 
land, especially brownfield and publicly owned land, for sustainable development” (ODPM 2003, 
p. 40). Crucially, English Partnerships was charged with developing a comprehensive national 
strategy for brownfield land and allocated over £500 million over three years to find and assemble 
housing sites. Although this was not devoted entirely to brownfield development, it enabled the 
agency to play a central enabling role in the development of the Thames Gateway, the fourth and 
largely brownfield growth area identified in the Sustainable Communities Plan. 
 
Other actions taken by English Partnerships included recourse to compulsory purchase powers to 
assemble brownfield land and an explicit programme targeted at the 17,000 hectares of hardcore 
brownfield land registered on NLUD, which has remained vacant or derelict since 1993. By 2005, 
the results of this more interventionist approach to brownfield land were beginning to show, with 
almost 123,000 dwellings completed on brownfield sites in that year. It had taken over a decade 
for the Government to realise that the real test of its ‘brownfield first’ approach was not its 
apparent commitment in principle but its willingness to devote powers and resources to effective 
intervention in the land market. 
 
Instead of a national brownfield target, local planning authorities in Scotland are encouraged to 
“… promote the re-use of previously developed land in preference to greenfield land, provided 
that a satisfactory residential environment can be created” (Scottish Executive, 2003, paragraph 
29). No public agency has prime responsibility for the reduction of vacant and derelict land and 
expenditure has been modest. 
 
Until the mid to late 1990s regeneration activity in Scotland had a strong physical dimension, 
including an emphasis on bringing brownfield land forward for redevelopment. Subsequently, it 
concentrated instead on economic development and social inclusion, especially after the election 
of the newly-devolved Scottish Parliament in 1999. There is an uneven geographical distribution 
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of brownfield land in Scotland. As the National Planning Framework (Scottish Executive, 2004, 
paragraph 156) makes clear:  
 
“While the greatest opportunities for reusing previously developed land lie in Glasgow 
and the Clyde Valley, the demand for land for new development is focused more 
strongly on the East. Even with a more even pattern of economic activity, there will 
be a need to accommodate a substantial growth in the number of households in or 
close to the Edinburgh city region over the next 25 years.”  
 
The Scottish experience demonstrates political interest in brownfield redevelopment, but not 
political will or commitment. This tentative approach can best be explained by limited strength of 
the environmental/rural protection lobby in Scotland, compared to England. As Table 2 showed, 
there has thus been hardly any reduction in vacant and derelict land in Scotland since 2001. This 
unwelcome pattern is unlikely to change without a radical re-think of brownfield land policy in 
Scotland. 
 
In contrast, there is considerable evidence of political interest, will and commitment to brownfield 
redevelopment in the United States. This, however, is not solely driven by federal mandates, but 
by state and local experimentation and initiative. In 1994, for example, the US Conference of 
Mayors cited brownfield land cleanup and redevelopment as its top priority. Since then, policy 
efforts aimed at redeveloping brownfield land, reducing risks to the environment and public health, 
and restoring blighted communities continue to receive support from numerous public, private, 
and nonprofit stakeholders. The Congressional vote to pass the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act, for instance, was overwhelming and bi-partisan (Wernsted et al, 
2004). Funding for the brownfield land programs has also remained stable over the last half-decade 
despite a decline in other environmental areas. 
 
Much of the financial and regulatory support for brownfield land redevelopment in the US since 
the mid-1990s has been led by the federal Environmental Protection Agency. Unlike the British 
focus on protecting greenfield land, US attention has focused on economic development projects 
that seek to create or preserve businesses, jobs, and taxation structures in the inner city, particularly 
in Northeast and Midwest areas affected by deindustrialization (Bartsch 1996). The EPA 
introduced the Brownfields Action Agenda in 1995 to help clarify the Federal Government’s role in 
brownfield land, make funds available for pilot projects to test redevelopment approaches, and 
provide direct assistance to those interested in redeveloping sites. This example of federal 
commitment to learning from experience was further strengthened in 1997 when the federal 
government announced the Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda bringing together 
the resources of more than 15 federal agencies. The EPA estimates that since its inception in 1995, 
investment in the Brownfields Program has leveraged more than US$6.5 billion in brownfield land 
cleanup and redevelopment funding from the private and public sectors and created approximately 
25,000 new jobs (US EPA, 2007a).  
 
In the early to mid-1990s, many state governments began implementing Voluntary Clean-up Programs 
to loosen rigid redevelopment policy structures and offer more support for redevelopment and 
protection from liability. While the US EPA continues to manage the cleanup of the country’s 
most contaminated sites, most brownfield land is now managed via state programmes. All 50 states 
have participated in the federal government’s brownfield programme and have established 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCPs), up from 30 in 1997 (Jenner et al, 1997; Simons, 1998; Meyer 
and Lyons, 2000). As might be expected from more ‘bottom-up’ policy solutions, State 
programmes vary in the way in which cleanups are implemented and extent of state oversight 




As with the federal EPA, state governments favour directing resources to properties with some 
economic development activity or taxable end use, as opposed to just cleanup (US EPA, 2006). 
Local government goals have also been primarily inclined toward economic development with tax 
base growth, job creation, neighbourhood revitalization, and environmental protection being the 
most frequently cited benefits according to municipalities surveyed by the US Conference of 
Mayors. Those involved in housing development have pointed out that despite the increase in 
market demand for housing in many cities, it continues to be difficult to obtain funds for residential 
projects because grant criteria emphasise jobs and tax benefits. Thus, again, one apparent solution 
to brownfield decay creates another problem in setting the boundaries for benefit. 
 
Despite stakeholders in Canada also decrying the complexity, uncertainty, and variability of 
regulatory systems overseeing remediation and redevelopment, the federal government has given 
this relatively little attention. Indeed, federal interest in brownfield land redevelopment has 
consisted largely of information gathering, federal property management, and limited financial 
assistance provision. In December 2001, the federal government assigned the task of developing 
a national brownfields redevelopment strategy for Canada to the National Round Table on the 
Environment and the Economy (NRTEE). The NRTEE convened a task force of stakeholders 
representing different interests who worked to develop recommendations for all levels of 
government. Its 2003 strategy articulated a vision for transforming Canada’s brownfield land into 
economically productive, environmentally healthy and socially vibrant centers of community life 
through the coordinated efforts of all levels of government, the private sector and community 
organizations. It was not until 2005, however, that the Federal Government announced several 
long-term commitments to funding redevelopment (Industry Canada, 2005; 
aboutremediation.com, 2006). Of the almost $5bn committed, over 95% was earmarked for 
federally-related projects and technological development. 
 
Most brownfield regulation in Canada is the responsibility of provincial or municipal government, 
which typically holds the private sector financially responsible for cleanup and development. Cities 
with strong real estate markets, such as Vancouver and Toronto, along with the growing suburban 
municipalities, have been highly successful in realizing brownfield projects, despite little or no 
financial assistance from government. Industrial brownfield land has often been rezoned to 
residential use, thus raising land values and allowing developers to manage contamination while 
making a suitable profit. In Quebec, stronger financial and management support from both local 
and provincial governments has made development possible in weaker market areas. 
 
Unfortunately, smaller peripheral communities in Canada with industrial legacies, weaker real 
estate markets, and limited resources face tough challenges because their plight is often 
overshadowed by the relative success of strong-market municipalities within the same province. 
This has induced a more hands-off and piecemeal approach by upper levels of government in 
implementing policy and funding measures, ultimately slowing down the maturing and 
convergence of such policies within Canada. Nevertheless, rapid growth in some urban regions 
has rekindled provincial concern about sprawl and sustainability. Canada’s largest province, 
Ontario, recently introduced greenbelt legislation that aimed to provide a stimulus to brownfield 
development, while British Columbia announced in 2008 a $10-million remediation fund to create 
green opportunities on brownfield land. 
 
In both Britain and North America, brownfield policy development can be characterised as a 
reaction to both the emerging brownfield agenda itself and to the pressures brought to bear by 
environmental or local governance interests seeking a solution. Moreover, as the English 
experience shows in particular, when hesitant and partial responses by government were shown to 
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be adequate, these experiential feedback mechanisms created the demand for further policy 
refinement. The much stronger central government involvement in England, even in comparison 
with Scotland let alone North America, has channelled significant public resources to tackling 
market failure, rather than simply exploiting market success. The latter approach, which has been 
more evident in Canada and to a lesser extent, Scotland and the United States, reflects a more 
limited and decentralised form of government intervention that emphasises local solutions to 
locally perceived problems. 
 
STAGE 2B: RECOGNISING POTENTIAL AND SECURING COMMITMENT: 
IDENTIFYING AND TACKLING THE MAIN CONSTRAINTS TO BROWNFIELD 
REDEVELOPMENT 
 
The second stage of policy maturity thus also involves an express political commitment to action 
aimed at tackling the main constraints to redevelopment. Strategic re-conceptualisation of 
brownfield land as a development opportunity rather than a planning problem occurs only if there 
is sufficient confidence for such development to be seen as a real business opportunity. The 
importance of this stage lies not in any broad policy statement issued by government but rather in 
the specific bestowal of financial resources or legal powers that demonstrate real commitment to 
private-sector developers and financiers. Tackling development constraints provides a good 
example of policy iteration for, like peeling the onion, the process of solving what initially appears 
to be the most important type of constraint merely helps reveal yet another type of constraint that 
requires yet more solutions. Experience across Britain and North America suggests that much of 
the onion has still to be peeled, as far as policy understanding of development constraints is 
concerned.  
 
Redevelopment of brownfield land can be constrained on both the demand and supply sides. On 
the demand side, both NLUD and SVDLS reveal that brownfield potential in the UK is regionally 
imbalanced, with a disproportionate concentration found in regions with traditionally weaker 
property markets. For example, in 2005, the former heavily industrialised North West of England 
had the largest amount of any English region both of previously-developed land (11,900 hectares) 
and of that which was vacant or derelict (8,700 hectares). In contrast “there is a lack of readily 
available urban brownfield land in the Southern regions compared with the Midlands and 
Northern regions” (English Partnerships, 2006, p. 25). There is a similar uneven geographical 
distribution of brownfield land in Scotland, with brownfield supply concentrated in Glasgow and 
the Clyde Valley, while demand for new development has been more focused around Edinburgh. 
 
Despite an extensive academic and policy literature of supply-side constraints to development, 
there is hardly any serious analysis in either NLUD or SVDLS of the extent to which brownfield 
land is so constrained. The nearest either sources approaches this crucial questions is in the analysis 
of development potential with SVDLS. This reveals that for sites where information was known 
in 2006, 41% of SVDLS land within settlements and 15% of that in the countryside was considered 
developable in the short term. If this is taken as a proxy for wholly unconstrained sites, it would 
suggest that almost 60% of urban land and 85% of rural land is in some way constrained. However 
the limited scope of this aspect of SVDLS cautions against over-interpretation of these figures and 
highlights instead the important research challenge of promoting consistent methods to classify 
and measure supply-side constraints to development. Traditionally, these have been 
conceptualised as falling under three main heading: planning/regulatory, physical and ownership. 
 
Although central government enthusiastically promotes the redevelopment of brownfield land, 
planning or regulatory constraints may counteract this policy at a local level. Two reasons for this 
are worth particular mention. First, local planning authorities may wish to reserve sites for an 
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apparently useful purpose for which current demand is low (for example, manufacturing industry) 
by preventing their immediate development for another purpose for which current demand is high 
(for example, housing). Secondly, potential local opposition to brownfield redevelopment should 
not be underestimated, especially in those parts of urban areas that “… are perceived as over-
developed, or overcrowded by their residents, where valuable open space has been lost, traffic is 
congested, and air, noise and light pollution are having a detrimental effect on the quality of life” 
(Williams et al, 1996, p. 93). Such resident opposition can readily influence the democratic process 
by which local planning decisions are made. 
 
Physical constraints may include the presence of substantial underground obstructions, such as 
old foundations or machinery bases, and redundant services. However, as Gore & Nicholson 
(1985, p. 187) pointed out: “Physical constraints … do not necessarily prevent development, as 
they can normally be expressed in terms of extra preparation or construction costs.” According to 
the Urban Task Force, even contamination (with the obvious exception of nuclear waste) should 
not be seen as a primarily technical problem since “In almost all cases, it is essentially a problem 
of finance and/or perceived legal risk” (Urban Task Force, 1999, p. 238). 
 
Ownership constraints in the UK have been more systematically analysed than planning or physical 
constraints. Adams et al (2001) contend that an ownership constraint can be said to exist if 
development is unable to proceed because the required ownership rights cannot rapidly be acquired 
through normal market processes. On this basis, they suggest that five main types of ownership 
constraints can be identified: 
 
• Ownership itself may be unknown or unclear; 
• Ownership rights may be divided if the power of freehold owners to sell development land 
with immediate vacant possession is restricted by lesser rights in the same land; 
• Ownership assembly may be required for development; 
• Owners may be willing to sell but not on terms acceptable to potential purchasers; 
• Owners may be unwilling to sell. 
 
In their study of 80 large redevelopment sites in four British cities, Adams et al. (2001) found that such 
ownership constraints disrupted plans to use, market, develop or purchase 64 of the sites between 
1991 and 1995. Altogether, 146 individual ownership constraints, or 1.8 per site, were found. Divided 
ownership rights proved the most prevalent form of constraint. However, since most existing leases 
on potential redevelopment sites were of short-term duration, their impact was limited. The need for 
ownership assembly was the most disruptive type of constraint. Multiple ownership of land, in 
particular, proved hard to resolve without the prospect of lucrative commercial development and/or 
state acquisition or intervention. Neither NLUD nor SVDLS currently collect such sophisticated 
information on ownership constraints, which remain an unresolved policy problem. Their simple split 
between public and private ownership disguises the wide variation in ownership motives and 
behaviour within these sectors revealed by Adams et al (2001). 
 
In the US, many studies have been carried out over the last decade to identify and prioritize the 
broad array of problems caused by brownfield land and the challenges facing their redevelopment. 
The most recent US Conference of Mayors study (2006) found that the main public-sector 
impediment (156 or 87% of cities) continues to be a lack of clean-up funds, followed by the 
challenges posed by carrying out environmental assessments (110 cities or 61 percent) and by 
liability issues (97 cities or 54 percent). These have been consistently identified as the top problems 
in the last five surveys carried out by that organization. That said, federal, state, and local initiatives 
have made tremendous headway in dealing with these problems.  Nationwide, these approaches 
and the lessons learned from them culminated in a more formalized federal commitment to action 
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with the 2002 passage of the federal Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act 
(Public Law 107-118, H.R. 2869). This Act codified and expanded EPA's brownfield land 
programme, clarified and exempted some parties from Superfund liability, and authorized funding 
to, and limited EPA's Superfund enforcement authority at, sites cleaned up under a state programs. 
 
In a 2000 study (De Sousa 2000), private-sector stakeholders involved in brownfield 
redevelopment in Ontario, Canada were asked to rank obstacles with respect to how they are 
perceived to affect brownfield project costs and risks. Those interviewed emphasized liability and 
regulatory mechanisms as the most severe obstacles because they add to project cost and duration. 
Moderate obstacles pertained mainly to policy (i.e. stringent remediation requirements, uncertainty 
regarding risk assessment), financing (i.e. lack of incentives, difficulties obtaining financing), and 
property perception factors. A recent study funded by the Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (2005) found that while redevelopment for housing faces the same barriers as those 
encountered by brownfield redevelopment in general, liability and regulatory barriers are perceived 
as being more significant because of the greater number of end users, which increases potential 
claimants and civil actions.  Despite the increase in provincial and municipal efforts to deal with 
these issues, there has been little interest by the federal government to formulate a national policy 
on brownfield land. 
 
Many of the supply and demand oriented constraints found in the UK are also present in the US 
and Canada: e.g. population growth rates in the brownfields-rich Northeast and Midwest are lower 
than those experienced in the west and south, economic development agencies hold on to land for 
potential reindustrialization, privately-owned and underused sites are ‘mothballed’ by landowners 
until they are willing to sell, and there are physical characteristics that pose challenges. 
Furthermore, suburban development is still significantly more attractive than urban brownfield 
land and only a few urban areas (e.g. Portland, Oregon, Minneapolis, Minnesota) have been willing 
to control urban sprawl through the implementation of growth boundaries.  But these and other 
challenges have shifted over time as governments develop, implement, and tweak policies and 
programs to overcome them. This political commitment to action is occurring at all levels of 
government in the US, but is sporadic across Canada. A good example of this is the downgrading 
of liability by many private sector stakeholders in the US, owing to the implementation of better 
protection for those undertaking redevelopment. Indeed, a study by Simons et al (2003) found that 
among the 46 states with Voluntary Cleanup Programs, only 12 out of 11,497 closed environmental 
cases were reopened (a rate of 0.1% to 0.2%).  As of mid-2007, nearly two-thirds of states also had 
some type of program in place to help finance the cleanup and reuse of brownfield land either 
directly or indirectly via tax incentives (23 states), direct financing (nearly half of the states), and 
other offsets to brownfield financing needs such as technical assistance, process facilitation, and 
project support (US EPA 2007b). 
 
We can thus see how challenging the successful implementation of brownfield policy can be, 
especially as it demands serious engagement with the unknown, uncertain and uncontrollable. The 
temptation for policy-makers is to concentrate on relatively easy brownfield sites and ignore those 
that are more heavily constrained. Ironically, however, the very experience of tackling the more 
difficult sites is an essential component of policy maturity, for the feedback experience it generates 
provides policy-makers with a fully rounded experience of real challenge of brownfield 
development and enables more effective policies to be formulated. Moreover, there remains little 
evidence in any of the four countries studied that brownfield policy has progressed to a strategic 
rather than incremental attack on development constraints, necessary to inspire widespread 




STAGE 3: GENERATING ENGAGEMENT: PRIVATE-SECTOR KEENNESS ON 
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 
 
The third and final stage of policy maturity tests the capacity of government policy and actions to 
provoke a private-sector response. Our thesis here is that the maturing or flowering of brownfield 
policy becomes evident in the extent and nature of private sector engagement. In one sense, that 
is all about the application of private-sector investment to deliver what it would consider the right 
development product, at the right location and at the right time. However, if brownfield policy 
simply produces private-sector gains, then questions might legitimately be asked about its maturity. 
Thus, in a different sense, policy maturity is not simply about pulling in private investment but 
about doing so in a manner that supports and helps achieve public policy goals. In this section, 
therefore, we investigate the private sector’s willingness to promote brownfield redevelopment. 
 
The UK development industry has traditionally been divided between those firms that concentrate 
on commercial and industrial development and those that are primarily housebuilders. Over the years, 
much commercial and industrial development has taken place on previously developed land, 
particularly in city centres, where major development companies worked in partnership with local 
authorities to redevelop obsolete central areas. Since the early 1980s, successive urban regeneration 
policies have encourage commercial developers to turn their attention to the production of retail 
centres, business parks and new offices in run down former industrial areas, including waterfront 
locations. Adair et al. (2004) have produced extensive evidence to show how long-term investment 
returns from regeneration property exceed national and local benchmarks. As English Partnerships 
(2006) Urban Regeneration Index shows, urban regeneration areas have outperformed the market as 
a whole in office and industrial property and tracked it in retail. 
 
Although housebuilding has turned its attention to brownfield redevelopment more recently, there is 
now substantial evidence to indicate a radical transformation over the past decade in the distribution 
of private residential output, at least in England. Research undertaken by Dixon et al. (2006) suggests 
that the largest English housebuilders were delivering between 50% and 74% of their output on 
brownfield land in 2004, while small and medium-sized housebuilders had also modified their 
business activities towards brownfield development. Since Dixon et al. calculate that brownfield sites 
accounted for 70% of the building plots with planning consents held in housebuilders’ land banks, it 
would seem that government policy has induced a fundamental shift in the place of production, at 
least in the short to medium term. Adams (2004) contends that speculative housebuilders who 
enthusiastically build up core competencies in brownfield housing are likely to emerge as the 
market leaders of the future, while those who continue to rely on past practices and technologies 
will face an uncertain future as greenfield development opportunities begin to reduce. This point 
is confirmed in a detailed case study of the Berkeley Group by Karadimitriou (2005). He writes: 
 
“The leading PDL housebuilder in London, the Berkeley Group, was a ‘first mover’ 
and seems to have benefited substantially from this. Their ability to cope with the 
demands of PDL regeneration has ensured superior growth rates and converted them 
from an insignificant niche developer to an industry leader”  (Karadimitriou, 2005, p. 
283).  
 
Yet, it remains unclear whether and to what extent the recent and significant switch in private 
housebuilding industry from greenfield towards brownfield locations represents an opportunity 
based business response to increased demand for more sustainable and centrally located homes 
rather than a mere reaction to policy pressure, which might be rapidly reversed if that policy were 
to be relaxed. In short, brownfield policy, at least in England, has yet to reach that stage of maturity 
where brownfield development is widely seen as well-entrenched source of strategic profit for the 
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private sector. This is also the case in many parts of the United States and Canada, outside the largest 
cities. 
 
In both the United States and Canada, the private sector has shown a keen interest in brownfield 
redevelopment and has been pivotal in pushing the brownfield agenda forward, although there 
seems to be little hope of curbing the residential greenfield market. As in the UK, the development 
industry in the US and Canada is subdivided into those firms that concentrate on commercial and 
industrial development and those that are interested primarily in residential development. The first 
players in the urban brownfield market are typically well-established firms that specialize in higher 
density urban projects. As the brownfield market matures, however, firms involved in greenfield 
development participate in the brownfield market as well. Interviews with private sector stakeholders 
in Milwaukee and Chicago (De Sousa 2008) indicate that most of the factors attracting them to 
brownfield land relate primarily to location and surrounding amenities, and to a lesser extent to 
attributes associated with brownfield sites (i.e. the low price of land, lot size, availability of 
buildings for reuse, etc.). 
 
Research carried out in Canada in the late 1990s reveals that private sector stakeholders are 
motivated primarily by economic factors such as maximizing return on investment, divesting 
liability risks/costs, acting on the growing popularity of downtown urban locations, and taking 
advantage of devalued brownfield property costs (De Sousa 2000). While the interviewees also 
identified environmental and social factors, these too were economically motivated - remediating 
a site to avoid any potential government intervention and protection of public health and safety to 
limit liability risks. As in the US, while there are efforts to promote more compact development in 
a few urban areas, there is little federal effort to curb greenfield development nationwide. 
 
A real test of policy maturity for brownfield development is thus the extent to which it serves to 
change private sector behaviour. This is of course much easier to achieve in strong than weak 
property markets. A truly mature policy thus concentrates not so much on changing sites as 
changing markets. This requires clear integration between brownfield land policy and broader 
urban strategy, which demands a high level of innovation and learning among policy-makers. 
Returning thus to the concept of policy formulation as a dialectic, introduced in Figure 1 at the 
start of the paper, we would suggest policy maturity in brownfield development requires effective 
mechanisms by which policy-makers can draw on the ‘bottom-up’ experience of market operators 
working at an individual site level, and that they do so in way that policy begins to shape markets, 




In the paper, we have sought to show how brownfield policy on both sides of the Atlantic has 
begun to mature, as policy makers have tried more fully to comprehend brownfield dimensions, 
to grasp how such a problem can be turned into an opportunity, and to reach out beyond the 
confines of the policy world to engage those with resources and expertise in the private sector, 
who might be best placed to make desired policy outcomes happen. We have sought to resist the 
temptation to portray our three stages towards policy maturity as inevitable or unproblematic, but 
instead to emphasis the challenges, pressures, interests and sheer events that make successful 
policy in this field often so hard to deliver. But in the end, these create the dialectic that enables 




Table 5: Summary of Comparative Analysis: Britain and North America 
 
  England 
 





Defining the term 
brownfield  
 
Previously developed land – 
opposite of greenfield 
Previously developed land – 
opposite of greenfield 
Known or potentially 
contaminated land 
Known or potentially 






About 5.5% of the total 
developed area of urban 
England brownfield & 
considered to have 
redevelopment potential in 2005 
Difficult to tell, but over 7% of 
Glasgow, Scotland’s most 
urbanised administrative area, 
vacant or derelict in 2006 
Difficult to tell, but probably 
between 450,000 and 1 million 
brownfield sites across US 
(estimated 6% of city area) 
Difficult to tell, but 
probably between 2,900 
and 30,000 brownfield 
sites across Canada 











especially since 1998 for 
residential redevelopment  
Residential development 
encouraged, but less important 
than in England 
Increasing policy importance, 
especially for economic 
redevelopment 
Geographically variable 
since only limited interest 








in weaker property markets. 
Planning, physical and 




in weaker property markets. 
Planning, physical and 
ownership constraints can also 
be problematic 
Cleanup cost, liability, and 
longer project duration due to 
environmental assessment and 
regulatory procedures.  The 
concentration of brownfield 
land in weaker central-city 
markets in the Northeast and 
Midwest can also be 
problematic. 












Most private sector 
housebuilding now on 
brownfield land 
Most private sector 
housebuilding now likely to be 
on brownfield land 
Increasing interest by private 
developers in particular 
brownfield locations for all 
land uses, but focus of 
residential development 
remains on suburban growth 
Emerging interest from 
private developers in 
stronger market locations 





Through this paper, we see the brownfield policy dialectic most clearly at particularly times and 
locations, such as in the refinement of brownfield definitions in both Britain and North America, 
in the articulation of brownfield land targets in England, and in the importance of experimental 
local pilot projects in the United States. We see less evidence of policy progression in the 
development of effective data systems, especially in North America, in the rather haphazard 
understanding of development constraints among policy-makers and especially in the 
embeddedness or otherwise of private sector commitment to brownfield redevelopment. In this 
context, there is reason to suspect that the current economic downturn will demonstrate the 
fragility of private-sector commitment to brownfield redevelopment to the extent that brownfield 
policy, even in England, has yet to mature to the stage where brownfield land is consistently seen 
as a source of strategic profit for the private sector. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that this policy journey has now produced an active ‘brownfield debate’ on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Within that debate, important differences exist between England, 
Scotland, the United States and Canada, which we have sought to summarise in Table 5. Here, we 
are reminded that the term ‘brownfield’ is generally reserved for potentially contaminated land in 
North America in contrast to the broader concept of previously developed land employed in 
England and Scotland. In North America, the words ‘greyfield’ and vacant land have begun to be 
used to bridge this definitional gap, though to a limited degree. The overall significance of 
brownfield land is hard to determine, except in England where official stock figures relative to 
total land area are most detailed. Nevertheless, it is apparent that in all four countries, 
deindustrialisation in particular has ensured increasing prominence for brownfield issues in recent 
years. In the United States, economic redevelopment has been seen as the priority in contrast to 
the emphasis on residential redevelopment in England and to a lesser extent, in Scotland. 
Increasing private sector interest is now evident across all four countries, whilst weaker property 
markets and specific site constraints generally remain important obstacles to be overcome in 
bringing brownfield land forward for development. 
 
What determines these differences and similarities between the four countries? Three main sets of 
influences are important here relating respectively to physical, cultural and institutional factors. 
 
In physical terms, the sheer scale of contamination in the United States has ensured its importance 
to policy makers. Although contamination in England and Scotland has been significant enough 
to demand its own policy and legislative regime, other physical factors such as the outworn nature 
of the urban fabric and associated infrastructure in areas where brownfield land is concentrated 
have required a broader conceptualisation of the policy problem. This has been reinforced by 
service-sector and administrative restructuring, which has created large brownfield sites (such as 
former hospitals) with little or no contamination. The geographic concentration of brownfield 
land in a handful of Canadian urban areas with relatively strong property markets has resulted in 
limited federal action and a more tepid response from provincial governments. 
 
Such physical differences are reinforced by cultural values and approaches in each country. North 
American concern to address deindustrialization and blight have helped concentrate government 
action on those sites in the worst condition (defined as potentially contaminated) and located in 
the most problematic areas, such as the cities of the Northeast and Midwest of the United States 
where brownfield land is often matched by high inner-city poverty and racial segregation. This, in 
turn, explains the emphasis on economic development and bringing employment and taxes back 
to ailing cities. 
 
It could be argued that in England, and to a lesser extent in Scotland, the cultural motivation 
behind brownfield land policy is quite different and originates from a longstanding desire to 
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protect greenfield land and prevent urban sprawl. Interestingly, such environmental motives are 
now becoming more important in North American land policy, as seen in the recently introduced 
greenbelt legislation in the province of Ontario and the brownfield to green opportunities fund in 
British Columbia, Canada. 
 
The most important differences, however, are institutional and are evident in an analysis of the 
varied roles of the public, private and voluntary sectors in the brownfield redevelopment process. 
In England, central government has been at the forefront of the brownfield agenda to a greater 
extent than the devolved government in Scotland and to a much greater extent that the federal 
administrations in North America. This is apparent in policy directions given to more local levels 
of government, in the provision of financial assistance and in the development of effective data 
systems. Yet even in North America, important contrasts are evident between the United States 
and Canada, with the federal level in the US playing a valuable role in setting the context for local 
action compared to Canada, where local initiative seems largely unfettered by institutional 
influence from the federal government. While federal disinterest in the brownfield agenda has thus 
been apparent in Canada, there is certainly greater evidence in the United States of federal policy 
and financial aid for those at the state and local levels who have demanded more support in 
combating urban deindustrialization and decay. Nevertheless, despite some early efforts by the 
Canadian federal government to track brownfield stocks, little investment has been made in 
effective national data systems in North America except in relation to more seriously contaminated 
lands. 
 
In England especially, voluntary and environmental groups have an important impact on the 
evolution of urban land policy, which is perhaps best demonstrated by the powerful influence of 
CPRE (the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England) on national planning policy. Such 
action groups provide a critical connection between the psychological importance of the 
countryside in English literature, thinking and culture and the articulation of public policy on 
brownfield redevelopment. It has been argued that the relative weakness of such ‘bottom-up’ 
pressure in Scotland compared to England explains why brownfield land policy there has not really 
evolved beyond the stage of political interest and that without a stronger cultural antagonism to 
urban expansion, there will be little basis for the dialectic necessary to move from political interest 
to political will and commitment. 
 
As English land policy has hardened in recent years towards an ever-stronger emphasis on 
brownfield re-use, so has the private sector in the form of speculative residential developers 
turning their attention from extensive greenfield estate development towards repairing the urban 
fabric through the extensive provision especially of new apartments on brownfield sites. Over half 
of all recent residential development in the UK (and possibly as much as 70%) has been 
constructed on brownfield sites. Such private sector interest in the implementation of public policy 
is evident also in the United States, where the original commitment of well-established residential 
developers specialising in high-density urban projects is increasingly complemented by the 
diversification of previously greenfield specialists.  That said, suburban development is still the 
norm and expansion onto Greenfield land continues to proceed largely unchecked. 
 
In a sense, then, this comparison of brownfield redevelopment in Britain and North America both 
reflects the specific physical, cultural and institutional context of each country and provides a point 
of entry through which the impact of those particular differences and similarities can be 
understood in a tangible way. The importance of this for researchers is apparent in the potential 
of the brownfield agenda on both sides of the Atlantic to act as an equally important vehicle to 
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